President Donald Trump issued a full-throated endorsement of Rep. Abe Hamadeh, R-Ariz., backing the lawmaker for re-election less than half a year into the freshman House member’s first term in office.

‘Abe Hamadeh has my Complete and Total Endorsement for Re-Election – HE WILL NEVER LET YOU DOWN!’ the president declared in a Truth Social post in which he described the congressman as ‘an America First Patriot.’

Trump endorsed Hamadeh in December 2023, ahead of the 2024 GOP U.S. House primary in Arizona’s 8th Congressional District.

But then later he issued an unusual dual endorsement of both Hamadeh and another GOP primary candidate, Blake Masters, just ahead of the 2024 contest that Hamadeh ultimately won.

Back in February Hamadeh introduced a resolution to limit the types of flags that may be displayed in House facilities, though the text of the proposal stipulates that it would not ‘apply to the individual personal office space of a Member of the House of Representatives.’

The resolution would allow for displaying the American flag and various other kinds of flags, some of which would include ‘The State flag of the represented district of a Member of the House of Representatives, displayed adjacent to the office of such Member’ and ‘The flags of visiting foreign dignitaries during an official visit.’

‘Congress is supposed to embody the AMERICAN people. That’s why I’ve introduced a resolution to ban foreign and ideological flags in the Halls of Congress. It’s pathetic that I even have to introduce this resolution,’ Hamadeh declared in a tweet this month.

Six other House Republicans are listed as cosponsors on congress.gov, including three original cosponsors and three other lawmakers listed as backing the measure this month.

‘You have inspired me and so many other young men and women to fearlessly serve our country in our nation’s Armed Services and the halls of Congress,’ Hamadeh wrote in a June 14 letter to Trump marking the president’s 79th birthday and the Army’s 250th.

On October 7, 2023, like many around the world, I awoke to news of the horrific attacks perpetrated by Hamas against more than 1,200 innocent Israeli, American and other civilians who that day were doing nothing other than going about their lives. The television newscasts were bone-chilling – pictures of mutilated babies; of fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers slain in front of family members; of peace activists murdered in cold blood; and of the taking of 250 hostages, some of whom more than 20 months on are still being held.  

Later that day, the United States called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council to address this mass terror attack, the largest murder of Jews since the Holocaust. As the American ambassador to the UN responsible for Security Council matters, I represented the United States at the October 8 emergency meeting and demanded the council issue a statement expressly condemning Hamas for the ruthless terrorist attacks.  

Unfortunately, Russia, China and a few other council members refused to endorse such a statement. To put it simply, their refusal to call a spade a spade was abhorrent and incomprehensible. Note: To this day, the Security Council has yet to formally declare Hamas a terrorist group. 

Going into the October 8 emergency Security Council meeting, there had rightfully been much global sympathy for Israel – and certainly an expectation that Israel would have to respond militarily. However, once Israel took measures to defend itself, a right enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, many nations, most notably from the Global South, condemned Israel’s response as disproportionate and used it as a rallying cry to further isolate Israel in the multilateral system and beyond.  

To me and many of my U.S. government colleagues, this was not unexpected. Since joining the UN in 1948, there has been an unfortunate decline in support for Israel at the world body, a decline that began to accelerate following the period of decolonization in the 1960s. Many former colonies wrongly began to view the Israel-Palestinian conflict through the prism of their own struggles against European colonizers, with Israel viewed as a colonizer and the Palestinians as being colonized. 

Israel’s relationship with the UN reached a nadir in 1975, when the UN General Assembly passed a highly politicized resolution equating Zionism with racism, a document that was finally revoked by the UNGA in 1991. Regrettably, efforts by the Palestinians and their supporters to isolate Israel at the UN have not abated and in fact have intensified since October 7, 2023.  

During my two-plus years in New York as ambassador, I engaged in a great deal of difficult diplomacy on the situation in Gaza and cast the sole veto of two UNSC draft resolutions related to the war, both of which lacked a clear condemnation of Hamas, a direct linkage of a ceasefire to the release of hostages, and a reference to Israel’s Article 51 rights. 

Had these texts been adopted by the council, they would not have delivered an immediate ceasefire or a release of the hostages – but certainly would have given Hamas the time and space to rearm. Other council representatives privately agreed but nevertheless felt increasing pressure from their capitals to produce a council document calling for an immediate ceasefire. 

From the beginning of the conflict through the end of the Biden administration, the U.S. regularly proffered creative alternatives on ceasefire language, while most other council members insisted on an explicit reference to an immediate ceasefire. On rare occasions, the council was able to find common ground on Gaza wording when it focused on upholding the principles of humanitarian assistance and protection of civilians. 

But when some members opted to abandon council unity and force votes on resolutions containing unacceptable ceasefire language, the U.S. was left with no choice but to exercise its veto. Before each veto was cast, we recognized the potential collateral damage to America’s international reputation; however, in our view the adoption of an unbalanced council resolution would have made a ceasefire neither practicable nor implementable given the highly charged and extremely complex situation on the ground.  

In the United States’ view, the establishment of a limited and credible negotiation channel was essential for achieving an effective, durable and sustainable end to the war. While the Biden administration didn’t achieve an end to the war on its watch, it did negotiate a three-phase diplomatic framework to pause the fighting and release the hostages, which was ultimately blessed by the council and backed by the Trump administration. 

To this day, one key factor hampering council unity on Gaza is Moscow and Beijing’s exploitation of the situation there for a clear geopolitical end: deflect international attention away from Russia’s savage war against Ukraine. In response to Russian statements in the Council on Gaza, which habitually condemned the U.S. for allegedly facilitating Israeli actions, I constantly reminded council members that Russia was in no position to criticize any country given the horrific war of aggression it was conducting in Ukraine.  

I also publicly warned Chinese diplomats that should they continue making false accusations about the U.S. concerning Gaza, I would immediately call out their country’s support to Russia’s military industrial base, refuting Beijing’s fictitious claim that it supports neither party to the conflict. Russia and China must end their politicization of Gaza and either contribute constructively to peace efforts or simply get out of the way. 

While I had expected Russia and China to take adversarial positions, I was extremely disappointed that three U.S. partners on the council, Slovenia, Algeria and Guyana, chose to regularly piggyback on Russian and Chinese political shenanigans to push for more urgent council action on the issue. Their aim was to shame the U.S. and compel it to change course from its steadfast support of Israel in the war with Hamas.  

All the while, the three had been keenly aware that Washington was conducting sensitive negotiations behind the scenes with Israel, Qatar and Egypt on steps to facilitate a durable end to the fighting and ease civilian suffering in Gaza. But instead of getting fully behind those steps and working with us in good faith, they preferred to ratchet up public pressure on the U.S. and ignore American concerns about how their actions would be manipulated by Hamas and other malign actors in the region – Iran, Hezbollah and the Houthis – to the detriment of regional peace and security.  

Given persistent council divisions over the war in Gaza, some UN member states continue to lay the diplomatic predicate for a future General Assembly resolution (non-legally binding) calling for sanctions, an arms embargo and other tough international measures against Israel. 

The recent U.S. veto of another council resolution on Gaza will certainly provide fuel for those efforts. As I write, the Palestinians and their allies continue to ponder additional pathways to go after Israel throughout the UN system. There is even discussion in some UN circles about suspending Israel’s voting rights in the General Assembly, an act that would deeply anger Washington and trigger severe political consequences for the UN.  

Since this tragic conflict began, I have been mystified as to why many UN officials believe that all the U.S. has to do is instruct Israel to end its pursuit of Hamas and then somehow a magical end to the fighting would materialize.  

On their part, I sense a genuine reluctance to treat Israel as a legitimate state with its own national security concerns. While the United States does indeed have influence with Israel, it is naïve at best for these colleagues to think America can simply dictate to Jerusalem what it should and shouldn’t do in response to what it perceives as existential threats.  

Russia and China must end their politicization of Gaza and either contribute constructively to peace efforts or simply get out of the way. 

Misguided pressure on the U.S., relentless efforts to isolate Israel, Russian and Chinese diversionary tactics, blatant antisemitism, and a reluctance by some states to compromise continue to stymie the Security Council’s ability to speak with one voice on ending the Gaza war. Until these unfortunate practices cease, the council will remain irrelevant to a resolution to Gaza and the broader Israel-Palestinian conflict. 

While no one can ignore the terrible tragedy that is now Gaza, it remains a fact that those UN member states that have influence with Hamas have made a strategic decision not to use it. The hesitancy of many countries over the years to publicly condemn Hamas as a terrorist group has only given it the oxygen it needs to carry on, no matter how much death and suffering Palestinians in Gaza continue to experience.   

To end this war, Hamas must disarm and disband. There will not be peace in Gaza until it does. Gazans deserve an opportunity to live in peace and to seek a prosperous future. Hamas’ continued rule will bring them neither. 

In 1823, President James Monroe drew a firm line in the sand: the Western Hemisphere would be closed to further European interference and, most importantly, America’s primary domain of industrial, political, and military control. The Monroe Doctrine, while audacious, proved effective and laid the groundwork for the Western Hemisphere as America’s stepping stone to the rest of the world. America was not yet a superpower and could not enforce it alone, however. Instead, America aligned British naval dominance with our interests to build a coalition of opportunity. America asserted its position, secured a partner through alignment against common rivals, and laid the groundwork for its emergence as a global superpower.

We find ourselves at a similar inflection point. The battleground isn’t about territory or shipping lanes, however. Today, it’s about computing power and associated techno-industrial dominance. Given the rate of change and speed of adoption, the stakes are higher than ever. 

Artificial intelligence turns data centers into industrial hubs for exponential innovation. Today, a country’s value lies not only in human capital and raw resources but also in hardware, the sovereignty to choose its own destiny, and control of the global AI technology ecosystem. 

To maintain dominance in this new era, America needs a new Monroe Doctrine, for AI: one founded on realism, committed to fostering hemispheric stability, and laser-focused on expanding our technological sphere of influence to secure the future.

Three Core Operating Principles for a Monroe Doctrine of AI

1. Flood the world with American AI Hardware

Export controls have become the default tool for U.S. policymakers attempting to contain China’s rise in AI, but they are backfiring. Instead of crippling China, they have harmed America’s most important tech company: NVIDIA. Its market share in China has plummeted from 95% to 50% in just four years, not due to superior Chinese competition, but because U.S. policy rendered the sale illegal. 

This created a vacuum in the world’s second-largest AI market. Into that vacuum stepped Huawei, offering not only rival chips but also building an entire AI ecosystem from the ground up: rare earth mining, chip design, infrastructure, and models. They aren’t just catching up. We’re handing them the advantage.

Rather than making ourselves an unreliable trading partner for countries eager to buy our most critical export, the U.S. should saturate the free world with American chips, which are hardened at the hardware level for security and compliance. This isn’t merely about defeating China. It’s about becoming the system that others rely on. The goal is to make our stack, our chips, our software, our standards, as indispensable as the dollar. Power comes from ubiquity, not scarcity.

2. Re-anchor the Western Hemisphere

The Western Hemisphere remains America’s home-field advantage. Leaders like Nayib Bukele in El Salvador and Javier Milei in Argentina are discarding outdated anti-American orthodoxies. They are pragmatic, growth-focused, and receptive to deeper cooperation. Now is the time to act.

Nearshoring involves more than just mitigating supply chain risks; it represents an industrial strategy. The U.S. should concentrate on high-end manufacturing: data center infrastructure, power systems, and semiconductors. Meanwhile, our neighbors in the Americas can handle lower-margin but crucial production that supports AI infrastructure at a lower cost than China, along with enhanced trust and transparency. Mexico is among the most affordable locations globally for manufacturing and assembly.

Artificial intelligence turns data centers into industrial hubs for exponential innovation. Today, a country’s value lies not only in human capital and raw resources but also in hardware, the sovereignty to choose its own destiny, and control of the global AI technology ecosystem. 

Re-anchoring our hemisphere to America’s AI ecosystem is how we create a foundation for the AI age, a Marshall Plan for computing, chips, and code. Let China maintain its Belt and Road of low-cost spyware. We’ll develop a hemisphere of excellence and trust.

3. Protect the Indo-Pacific Front, The Ring of Fire

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are the front lines of U.S.-China tech competition. Their fabrication facilities, standards, and developer ecosystems shape the global AI ecosystem. If we don’t support them with open access to U.S. technology and customers for U.S. products, China will. China is willing, and increasingly able, to fill any vacuum we leave behind.

And it’s not just the big three who are part of the Ring of Fire. Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam are all in play. Each has a tense, complex relationship with Beijing and is actively seeking deeper tech and trade ties with the U.S. The window is open, but not forever.

That means rethinking how we deploy tools like export controls and tariffs. Tariffs misalign incentives, punish allies, and raise the cost of the very inputs we need to reshore advanced manufacturing. Export restrictions that limit friendly access only help China’s competitors build alternatives. Export controls and tariffs should hamper our adversaries, not our companies and platforms.

Let’s be clear: the primary goal isn’t to slow China down. China is going to China. The goal is to stay ahead and play to our strength: open markets that scale. That’s how we win.

The Strategic Moment

With America’s AI lead established and our exports increasingly central to global tech supply chains, it’s time to seize the moment, not squander it. If the goal is to contain China, rather than ceding market share and fueling anti-American resentment, then we need to reassess what AI means to us and the world.

With America’s AI lead solidified and our exports increasingly anchoring global tech supply chains, now is the moment to act boldly, not cautiously. If the goal is to contain China, not cede ground or fuel anti-American resentment, we must rethink what AI represents, not just as a tool, but as a geopolitical weapon of alignment.

Misguided export controls and blanket tariffs don’t protect us—they shrink U.S. market share, raise production costs, and hand China the time and space to build behind a wall of protectionism. That’s not industrial strategy. That’s industrial retreat.

The solutions are simple. What’s required is political will. If China achieves independent AGI and exports its standards to our current allies, we won’t just lose influence; we’ll lose the framework that made us a superpower. But if we establish the U.S. as the default AI stack, flood friendly markets with our computers, and build a hemispheric manufacturing base around it, we won’t just hold the lead and we’ll lock it in for a generation.

The original Monroe Doctrine laid the groundwork for the American century. It worked because we had aligned allies and clear strategic priorities. In the AI era, we need the same: nearshored production, fortified Indo-Pacific alliances, and a trade regime that builds markets, not walls.

That’s how you make Beijing panic.